Legislative Redistricting
The definition of partisan symmetry as a standard for fairness in redistricting; methods and software for measuring partisan bias and electoral responsiveness; discussion of U.S. Supreme Court rulings about this work. Evidence that U.S. redistricting reduces bias and increases responsiveness, and that the electoral college is fair; applications to legislatures, primaries, and multiparty systems.
U.S. Legislatures
There’s a simple solution to the latest census fight.” Boston Globe, Pp. A9. Publisher's VersionAbstract
. 7/26/2021. “
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Evaluations of Partisan Fairness in District-Based Democracies.” American Political Science Review, 114, 1, Pp. 164-178. Publisher's VersionAbstract
. 2020. “
How to conquer partisan gerrymandering.” Boston Globe (Op-Ed), 292 , 179 , Pp. A10. Publisher's VersionAbstract
. 12/26/2017. “
Edited transcript of a talk on Partisan Symmetry at the 'Redistricting and Representation Forum'.” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter, Pp. 55-58.Abstract
. 2018. “
How to Measure Legislative District Compactness If You Only Know it When You See It.” American Journal of Political Science, 65, 3, Pp. 533-550. Publisher's VersionAbstract
. 2021. “
The U.S. Supreme Court responds favorably to the nonpartisan Amici Curae Brief on partisan gerrymandering filed by Gary King, Bernard Grofman, Andrew Gelman, and Jonathan Katz (see brief) and requests additional information. This information is provided in the context of a brief history of the scholarly literature, a summary of the state of the art in conceptualization and measurement of partisan symmetry, and the state of current jurisprudence, in: . 2008. “The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry.” Election Law Journal, 6, 1, Pp. 2-35.Abstract
Hidden Section
The concept of partisan symmetry
The concept of partisan symmetry as a standard for assessing partisan gerrymandering:
Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King, Bernard Grofman, Andrew Gelman, and Jonathan Katz in Support of Neither Party.” U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Perry.Abstract
. 2005. “
Brief of Heather K. Gerken, Jonathan N. Katz, Gary King, Larry J. Sabato, and Samuel S.-H. Wang as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees.” Filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in Beverly R. Gill et al. v. William Whitford et al. 16-1161 .Abstract
. 2017. “
Seats, Votes, and Gerrymandering: Measuring Bias and Representation in Legislative Redistricting.” Law and Policy, 9, Pp. 305–322.Abstract
. 1987. “
Defines, distinguishes, and measures "partisan bias" and "electoral responsiveness" (or "repesentation"), key concepts that had been conflated in much previous academic literature, and "partisan symmetry" as the definition of fairness to parties in districting. A consensus in the academic literature on partisan symmetry as the definition of partisan fairness has held since this article. . 1987. “Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review, 81, Pp. 1252–1273.Abstract
Related work on clarifying normative assumptions underlying proposed standards for fairness to different ethnic groups, and formalizes several absolute standards. . 1996. “Racial Fairness in Legislative Redistricting.” In Classifying by Race, , Pp. 85-110. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Abstract
Methods for measuring partisan bias and electoral responsiveness
The methods for measuring partisan bias and electoral responsiveness, and related quantities, that first relaxed the assumptions of exact uniform partisan swing and the exact correspondence between statewide electoral results and legislative electoral results, among other improvements:
The first attempt to eliminate the exact uniform partisan swing assumption, using data from a single election. . 1989. “Representation Through Legislative Redistricting: A Stochastic Model.” American Journal of Political Science, 33, Pp. 787–824.Abstract
The most technically sophisticated method, many aspects of which were simplified in the above paper. . 1990. “Estimating the Electoral Consequences of Legislative Redistricting.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 85, Pp. 274–282.Abstract
A now widely used set of methods for estimating bias and responsiveness, including applications to redistricting in the states and the U.S. Congress. . 1994. “A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans.” American Journal of Political Science, 38, Pp. 514–554.Abstract
Paradoxical benefits of redistricting
Demonstrates the paradoxical benefits of redistricting to American democracy, even partisan gerrymandering, (as compared to no redistricting) in reducing partian bias and increasing electoral responsiveness. (Of course, if the symmetry standard were imposed, redistricting by any means would produce less bias than any other arrangement.)
Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting.” American Political Science Review, 88, Pp. 541–559.Abstract
. 1994. “
A shortened, popular version of the previous article. . 1996. “Advantages of Conflictual Redistricting.” In Fixing the Boundary: Defining and Redefining Single-Member Electoral Districts, , Pp. 207–218. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company.Abstract
Other Districting Systems
Unifies existing multi-year seats-votes models as special cases of a new general model, and was the first formalization of, and method for estimating, electoral responsiveness and partisan bias in electoral systems with any number of political parties. . 1990. “Electoral Responsiveness and Partisan Bias in Multiparty Democracies.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, XV, Pp. 159–181.Abstract
Formalizes normative criteria used to judge presidential selection contests by modeling the translation of citizen votes in primaries and caucuses into delegates to the national party conventions and reveals the patterns of biases and responsiveness in the Democratic and Republican nomination systems. . 1990. “Measuring the Consequences of Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations.” Journal of Politics, 52, Pp. 609–621.Abstract
Evaluates the partisan bias of the electoral college, and shows that there is little basis for reform of the system. Changing to popular vote of the president would not even increase individual voting power. . 2004. “Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College.” In Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of American Electoral Reform, , Pp. 75-88. New York: Oxford University Press.Abstract
Software
Data
The Record of American Democracy, 1984-1990.” Sociological Methods and Research, 26, Pp. 424–427. Publisher's Version
. 1998. “