

Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large Scale Randomized Experiments — A Supplementary Appendix

May 12, 2017

Abstract

This is a supplementary appendix to “Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Generate Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large Scale Randomized Experiments”

1 Introduction

Most of the figures, tables, and analyses in this Supplementary Appendix are referenced directly in our paper. Items not referenced in the paper are briefly explained here:

- Figures 1 and 2 provide the timeline of the SPS and *Progresa* evaluations, and details about the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections in Mexico.
- When a precinct contains experimental villages belonging to health clusters from different treatment regimes, we delete the precinct from the precinct cluster (although we found that including these, including them with an indicator variable, or excluding these precinct clusters entirely do not affect our conclusions). The map on the left panel of Figure 3 of this Supplementary Appendix illustrates one example of two clusters located in Sonora with villages from different health clusters, assigned to different treatment regimes. In this case we find that village centroids from treatment health clusters (blue dots) and from control health clusters (red dots) appear in some of the same precincts (light green areas). As a result, such “contaminated” precincts have an undefined treatment status and are removed from the analysis.
- Tables 6–8 report regression estimates and sample characteristics for the results under each of the specifications displayed in the paper in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 13 reports estimates for the causal effect of *Progresa* on turnout, measured as the total number of votes cast (valid and invalid votes) over the total number of registered voters.
- In Figures 14 and 15, we examine whether the effects of the *Progresa* poverty alleviation program vary by poverty levels. Tables 16–21 and Figures 18–19 report results when implementing the same specifications discussed in the paper with a sample we generated by mapping the geographic coordinates of villages across precincts, instead of the name-matching procedure adopted in De La O (2013, 2015). These additional specifications and results lead to the same conclusion: *Progresa* had no statistically significant effect on either voter turnout or incumbent support.

- As a robustness check, we repeated our analyses with all available precinct clusters, even when no match was available. The results appear in Tables 2 and 3. These results reveal that our conclusions in this regression framework remain unchanged from those in the text of the paper.

2 Additional Empirical Analyses




Figure 1: **SPS Evaluation Timeline.** The figure displays the timeline of the SPS evaluation and the date of Mexico’s 2006 presidential election. In the presidential contest PAN, the incumbent party, competed against PRI, a leftist coalition under the PRD leadership, and two other minor parties (PSD and Nueva Alianza). The PAN candidate was victorious, defeating the PRD candidate by a half percentage point.




Figure 2: **Progresa Evaluation Timeline.** Researchers sampled 320 villages across seven states that were incorporated to the program by its second phase of expansion, and defined this set as the treatment group. As the control group, the researchers then sampled 186 that would be covered in later phases of the program (phases 10 and 11). (Further details of the Progresa evaluation are discussed in Coady (2000) and Skoufias (2005, ch. 3).) The 2000 presidential election took place on July 2nd. PRI was the incumbent party, and competed against a center-right coalition headed by PAN, a center-left coalition headed by PRD, and two smaller parties (PARM and PCD). The PAN-coalition was the winner in this contest, beating the PRI candidate by just over 6 percentage points.




Figure 3: **Avoiding Contamination in Defining Rural Precinct Clusters.** The left panel maps village centroids from a control health cluster (red) and treatment health cluster (blue) in Sonora. Some precincts contain only treatment villages (gray areas with dark gray outlines); one precinct has only control villages (bright green area); and precincts in light green have treatment and control villages. We include in our analysis precincts with village centroids from only a single evaluation cluster. In the case of the treatment cluster, for example, we only keep precincts in grey. The right panel shows the final composition of the treatment precinct cluster in our analysis (the combined gray areas), which include villages from treatment clusters (blue dots), along with village centroids that were not part of the experiment (black dots).

	Rural	Urban	Total
Precinct Clusters	102	27	129
Precincts	351	71	422
Villages	2012	-	2012
Pairs	47	10	57

Table 1: The table summarizes precinct clusters included in the analysis of the electoral impact of SPS. Out of the original 110 rural clusters, we are able to map precincts for 102. Of these we are able to analyze 47 pairs. In the urban sample we are able to map 27 out of the original 38 clusters, and out of these we are left with 10 pairs. Urban clusters were formed from census tracts instead of villages.




Figure 4: **Distribution of Pre-treatment Covariates Across Treatment Groups in SPS.** The figure shows fairly similar distributions across control and treatment groups in the distribution of lag outcomes. There is a precinct cluster in the treatment group reporting higher turnout, but dropping this observation from our analysis does not affect the main results in the paper.

	PAN (Vote Share)					PAN (Registered Voters)					PAN (Eligible Voters)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Treatment	-0.897 (2.177)	-2.937 (3.131)	-2.616 (3.094)	-2.186 (3.072)	0.651 (3.132)	-0.887 (1.445)	-2.217 (2.246)	-1.860 (2.190)	-1.565 (2.172)	0.348 (2.240)	-0.206 (1.971)	-1.690 (3.235)	-0.963 (3.093)	-0.864 (3.108)	2.397 (3.025)
Contaminated		1.774 (3.370)	2.437 (3.343)	2.931 (3.250)	4.341 (3.466)		-0.400 (2.202)	0.334 (2.116)	0.626 (2.046)	1.368 (2.322)		-1.552 (2.710)	-0.052 (2.460)	-0.177 (2.505)	1.577 (2.596)
Contaminated *		4.308 (4.319)	3.578 (4.344)	2.626 (4.269)	-2.601 (4.624)		2.838 (2.863)	2.029 (2.780)	1.434 (2.684)	-1.080 (3.151)		3.191 (3.875)	1.539 (3.562)	1.616 (3.547)	-2.712 (3.871)
Treatment Rural			-2.603 (2.872)	-1.858 (2.785)	0.002 (5.202)		-2.884 (2.093)	-2.388 (2.046)	-2.388 (2.046)	-1.338 (5.247)		-5.890** (2.995)	-5.799* (2.995)	-5.799* (2.995)	-2.119 (6.707)
Log(Population)				2.960* (1.676)	3.036 (2.051)		1.868* (1.079)	1.868* (1.079)	1.868* (1.079)	1.099 (1.481)		-0.153 (1.485)	-0.153 (1.485)	-0.153 (1.485)	-1.325 (2.250)
Number of Precincts				-0.332* (0.178)	-0.425** (0.172)		-0.237*** (0.088)	-0.237*** (0.088)	-0.237*** (0.088)	-0.245** (0.101)		-0.120 (0.151)	-0.120 (0.151)	-0.120 (0.151)	-0.106 (0.249)
Assets				40.562*** (14.621)	40.562*** (14.621)		30.192*** (12.842)	30.192*** (12.842)	30.192*** (12.842)	30.192*** (12.842)		44.193*** (18.202)	44.193*** (18.202)	44.193*** (18.202)	44.193*** (18.202)
Intercept	28.372*** (1.683)	27.555*** (2.516)	29.316*** (3.472)	6.963 (12.677)	-14.044 (14.292)	16.522*** (1.111)	16.706*** (1.753)	18.657*** (2.572)	4.617 (8.087)	-4.370 (9.347)	17.495*** (1.387)	18.209*** (2.287)	22.194*** (3.540)	23.676* (12.447)	8.217 (12.294)
Observations	129	129	129	129	90	129	129	129	129	90	129	129	129	129	90
R ²	-0.006	0.013	0.012	0.027	0.179	-0.005	-0.009	0.004	0.018	0.176	-0.008	-0.019	0.020	0.010	0.188

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: OLS estimates for ITT effect of SPS on Incumbent (PAN) Vote. The table reports OLS estimates for the ITT effect of SPS on PAN support. PAN support is measured with the total votes it received in the 2006 election as a share of total votes cast (Columns 1-5), registered voters (Columns 6-10), and eligible voters (Columns 11-15). The estimates show a null effect of SPS on PAN support across all alternative measures of support and regression specifications. This result is robust to controlling for a cluster's demographic, whether a cluster contains at least one contaminated precinct, population, number of precincts per precinct cluster, and level of cluster assets.

	Turnout (Reg. Voters)					Turnout (Eligible Voters)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	-0.947 (1.556)	-2.006 (2.016)	-1.474 (2.051)	-1.142 (2.036)	0.182 (2.715)	0.239 (3.226)	-0.930 (4.905)	0.675 (4.684)	0.285 (4.536)	3.843 (5.402)
Contaminated		-3.836* (2.087)	-2.741 (2.224)	-2.711 (2.252)	-2.984 (2.674)		-5.934 (4.194)	-2.628 (3.767)	-3.761 (3.883)	-2.101 (4.332)
Contaminated * Treatment		2.329 (3.146)	1.123 (3.106)	0.825 (3.198)	1.426 (3.944)		2.607 (6.397)	-1.034 (5.634)	0.677 (5.713)	-1.891 (7.132)
Rural			-4.301* (2.606)	-3.844 (2.640)	-3.233 (8.261)			-12.986*** (4.833)	-13.891*** (5.004)	-8.981 (13.653)
Log(Population)				1.054 (1.274)	-0.903 (1.882)			-5.074** (2.201)		-8.421** (3.631)
Number of Precincts				-0.321 (0.294)	-0.241 (0.387)				0.175 (0.209)	0.333 (0.631)
Assets				11.919 (13.166)						44.571* (26.889)
Intercept	57.160*** (1.054)	58.926*** (1.433)	61.835*** (2.445)	54.354*** (9.985)	63.254*** (14.398)	60.816*** (2.142)	63.548*** (3.291)	72.333*** (5.454)	111.578*** (19.514)	111.062*** (25.588)
Observations	129	129	129	129	90	129	129	129	129	90
R ²	0.003	0.030	0.068	0.105	0.130	0.00004	0.017	0.099	0.141	0.206

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: **OLS estimates for ITT effect of SPS on Turnout.** The table reports OLS estimates of the ITT effect of SPS on turnout. Turnout is measured with total votes cast as a share of registered voters (Columns 1-5) and eligible voters (Columns 6-10). The table show a null effect of SPS on turnout. The finding is robust to controlling for a cluster's demographic, whether a precinct cluster contains at least one contaminated precinct, population, and the number of precincts per precinct cluster.

	PAN (Vote Share)			PAN (Registered Voters)			PAN (Eligible Voters)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	0.038 (3.805)	0.655 (4.593)	-2.223 (5.395)	-0.265 (2.420)	0.340 (3.164)	-1.312 (3.426)	1.184 (3.303)	3.000 (4.484)	-0.519 (4.179)
Contaminated		7.012 (6.279)	2.171 (7.529)		3.149 (3.767)	0.231 (4.632)		4.368 (4.003)	-1.415 (4.609)
Contaminated * Treatment		1.195 (8.133)	6.822 (9.371)		-0.571 (4.848)	2.641 (5.677)		-4.088 (6.035)	2.811 (5.484)
Log(Population)			-8.373 (5.944)			-4.507 (3.887)			-10.537** (4.423)
Number of Precincts			3.526 (2.421)			2.354 (1.549)			3.986** (1.567)
Intercept	28.596*** (2.991)	25.547*** (3.693)	82.017** (40.971)	16.815*** (1.780)	15.446*** (2.281)	45.109* (26.792)	17.381*** (1.919)	15.482*** (2.446)	87.278*** (30.992)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
R ²	0.00000	0.081	0.136	0.0003	0.028	0.076	0.003	0.019	0.120

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: OLS estimates for ITT effect of SPS on PAN Support (Validated Rural Sample). The table reports OLS estimates for the ITT effect of SPS on PAN support in the set of precinct clusters where the aggregated level of population from the merging procedure described in Appendix A is within 5 percentage points of the official precinct population. PAN support is measured with the total votes it received in the 2006 election as a share of total votes cast (Columns 1-3), registered voters (Columns 4-6), and eligible voters (Columns 7-9). The estimates shows a null of effect of SPS on PAN support across all alternative measures of support and regression specifications. This result is robust to controlling for whether precinct clusters have at least one contaminated precinct, population, and the number of precincts per precinct cluster.

	Turnout (Reg. Voters)			Turnout (Eligible Voters)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	-1.423 (2.461)	-2.086 (3.083)	-2.652 (3.315)	2.543 (4.656)	6.263 (6.434)	1.262 (5.164)
Contaminated		-3.557 (3.146)	-4.827 (3.568)		1.500 (3.105)	-6.769 (4.656)
Contaminated * Treatment		0.576 (5.559)	1.638 (6.740)		-11.854 (7.988)	-2.055 (6.980)
Log(Population)			-0.952 (4.117)			-14.867*** (5.457)
Number of Precincts			1.453 (2.264)			5.784** (2.703)
Intercept	58.377*** (1.541)	59.923*** (2.091)	64.647** (28.061)	59.718*** (1.550)	59.066*** (2.418)	160.106*** (37.692)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50
R ²	0.007	0.040	0.068	0.006	0.049	0.143

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: OLS estimates for ITT effect of SPS on Turnout (Validated Rural Sample). The table reports OLS estimates of the ITT effect of SPS on turnout in the set of precinct clusters where the aggregated level of population from the merging procedure described in Appendix A is within 5 percentage points of the official precinct population. Turnout is measured with total votes cast as a share of registered voters (Columns 1-3) and eligible voters (Columns 4-6). The table shows a null effect of SPS on turnout. The finding is robust to controlling for a precinct's demographic, whether a precinct cluster contains at least one contaminated precinct, population, and the number of precincts per precinct cluster.




Figure 5: **Distribution of Baseline and Follow-Up Survey Responses to Economic, Political, and Social Retrospective Evaluations.** The figure displays barplots describing the very similar distribution of responses between treated and control groups in economic, political, and social retrospective evaluations of the country across treatment groups in both baseline and follow up surveys.




Figure 6: **ITT Estimates of SPS Effect on PAN Support (Votes as a Share of Registered and Eligible Voters).** This figure shows a null Intention-to-Treat (ITT) effect of SPS on PAN support measured with votes as a share of registered voters (vertical solid line) and eligible voters (vertical dashed line). The figure reports point estimates and 95 confidence intervals by cluster urbanicity (left panel), income quartile (middle panel), and household level of asset quartile (right panel).




Figure 7: ITT Estimates of SPS Effect on Alternative Measures of Turnout. This figure shows a null Intention-to-Treat (ITT) effect of SPS on turnout measured with total valid and invalid votes cast as a share of registered voters, and total (valid) votes cast as a share of eligible voters. The figure reports point estimates and 95 confidence intervals by precinct cluster demographic (left panel), expected household policy usage (middle panel), and household level of income quartiles (right panel). The left panel shows null SPS effect of on turnout across the combined, rural, and urban precinct cluster samples. The center panel shows that the policy’s effect does not vary by a household’s expected usage of the insurance, and the right panel shows that it does not depend on a household’s level of income.




Figure 8: ITT Estimates of SPS Effect on the Allocation of Opposition Party Resources. This figure shows a null Intention-to-Treat (ITT) effect of SPS on the difference in the log of opposition party representatives across precinct-clusters. The figure reports point estimates and 95 confidence intervals by precinct cluster demographic (left panel), expected household policy usage (middle panel), and household level of income quartiles (right panel). The left panel shows null SPS effect of on the allocation of party resources across the combined, rural, and urban precinct cluster samples. The center panel shows that the policy’s effect does not vary by a household’s expected usage of the insurance, and the right panel shows that it does not depend on a household’s level of income.




Figure 9: ITT Estimates of SPS Effect on PAN Support and Turnout by Proportion of Evaluation Population in Precinct Clusters. To address concerns of attenuation bias, the figure reports point estimates and 95 confidence intervals of the ITT effect of SPS on PAN support (vertical solid line) and turnout (vertical dashed line) by the share of evaluation population to total population across precinct clusters in rural areas. The figure shows a null effect of SPS even when include almost exclusively communities that participated in the evaluation.




Figure 10: **Differences-in-Differences Estimates of SPS Effect on Survey Responses to Retrospective Evaluations.** The figure shows SPS did not have an effect on the proportion of respondents who reported the country was doing better than five years ago in economic, political, and social domains. The figure reports point estimates and 95 confidence intervals by cluster demographic (left panel), expected household policy usage (middle panel), and household level of income quartiles (right side panel). The left panel shows a null effect in the combined, rural, and urban cluster samples. The other two panels show that the effect does not vary by the expected household compliance with the policy (middle panel) or by the level of household income (right panel). This analysis excludes a matched-cluster pair in Guerrero in which the treatment cluster experienced a significant decline in the proportion of respondents reporting an improvement in the country's social conditions. Including this observation only increases the uncertainty of point estimates in the quartile analysis, but does not change the main substantive results.




Figure 11: **Balance in Lag Outcomes Before and After Matching.** The figure shows the presence of significant imbalance in the lag outcomes analyzed in De La O (2013, 2015). In particular, the treatment group has several outliers in lag turnout and PRI support (left pair of each panel). This imbalance disappears after Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) on population and lag outcomes (right pair in each panel).




Figure 12: **Balance in Pre-Treatment Socio-Economic Covariates Before and After Matching.** The figure shows the presence of significant imbalance in the pre-treatment covariates in De La O (2013, 2015). In particular, the treatment group has several large population outliers. After Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) on population and lag outcomes, without affecting the balance in poverty and number of villages across precincts.

	Turnout (Original)					Official Turnout Among Registered Voters						
	Original Specification (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Original Specification (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	5.316* (3.040)	4.270 (2.860)	2.199 (2.291)	2.337 (2.282)	0.278 (1.499)	3.866 (2.865)	-0.685 (0.935)	-0.920 (0.893)	-0.747 (0.912)	-0.947 (0.918)	-0.805 (0.941)	-0.802 (0.941)
Avg. Poverty	1.401 (3.575)		2.047 (3.057)		0.479 (2.217)	1.198 (3.375)	-1.943** (0.978)			-1.892** (0.949)	-0.935 (1.400)	-1.959** (0.973)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.001 (0.001)				0.000 (0.000)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				-34.962*** (5.008)						-3.092*** (0.671)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.027 (0.024)			0.062*** (0.022)			-0.025* (0.010)			-0.017* (0.009)		-0.025** (0.010)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Original)					0.958*** (0.128)							
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Registered)												
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.036 (0.027)			0.028 (0.023)		0.044* (0.025)	0.033*** (0.011)			0.032*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.003)	0.033*** (0.011)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.040 (0.067)			0.065 (0.049)		0.112* (0.064)	0.044*** (0.016)			0.046*** (0.015)	0.018* (0.010)	0.049*** (0.016)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.025 (0.036)			0.027 (0.030)		0.053 (0.034)	0.024** (0.012)			0.024** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.027** (0.012)
Intercept	61.925*** (17.531)	63.815*** (2.006)		255.681*** (23.575)	13.386 (15.668)	63.564*** (16.559)	67.024*** (5.005)	58.060*** (0.732)		84.180*** (6.258)	47.164*** (13.927)	67.157*** (4.982)
Village FE	Yes 417 No 417	Yes 417 No 417	Yes 417 No 408	Yes 417 No 418	Yes 417 No 0.712	Yes 415 No 0.197	Yes 417 No 0.072	Yes 417 No 0.003	Yes 408 No -	Yes 417 No 0.104	Yes 417 No 0.173	Yes 415 No 0.080
R ²	0.116	0.004	-	0.388	0.697	0.156	0.025	0.0002	-	0.058	0.131	0.033
Adjusted R ²	0.071	0.002	-	0.388	0.697	0.156	0.025	0.0002	-	0.058	0.131	0.033
RMSE	31.005	30.965	-	25.033	18.011	29.067	8.616	8.554	-	8.47	8.358	8.614

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: **ITT Estimates of Progresá on Turnout.** The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on turnout. Turnout is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-6) and as a share of registered voters (Column 7-12). Column 1 reports the original positive effect found in De La O (2013, 2015). However, this estimate is not robust under a difference-in-means approach (Column 2), matching (Column 3), or under the original regression specification but controlling for log of population (Column 4), lag turnout in ratio (Column 5), or removing the two observations with the largest leverage (Column 6). Similarly, the table reports a null effect when relying on official turnout as the outcome of interest. This estimate is robust across all specifications (Columns 7-12).

	PRI (Original)						Official PRI Vote Share					
	Original Specification (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Original Specification (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	3.671** (1.598)	3.622** (1.733)	1.853 (1.679)	2.282* (1.326)	0.882 (1.156)	3.090** (1.551)	1.486 (1.419)	2.286 (1.776)	1.430 (1.829)	1.511 (1.429)	1.066 (1.331)	1.548 (1.438)
Avg. Poverty	2.854 (1.763)			3.080** (1.560)	3.866** (1.348)	2.774 (1.715)	4.835** (1.641)			4.851** (1.626)	5.005** (1.527)	4.846** (1.641)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.001*** (0.000)				0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				-16.476*** (2.155)						0.344 (1.137)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.031* (0.016)			0.012 (0.013)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.030** (0.015)	-0.019 (0.019)			-0.020 (0.019)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.019)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.058*** (0.019)			0.055*** (0.015)	0.061*** (0.017)	0.061*** (0.017)	0.055** (0.022)			0.055** (0.022)	0.054** (0.022)	0.054** (0.022)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.047 (0.038)			-0.034 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.119*** (0.030)			-0.120*** (0.030)		-0.123*** (0.031)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.025 (0.019)			-0.024 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.068*** (0.021)			-0.068*** (0.022)		-0.069*** (0.022)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.593*** (0.080)							
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.014 (0.150)							
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.050 (0.087)							
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)										0.314*** (0.100)		
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)										-0.481*** (0.143)		
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)										-0.252** (0.106)		
Intercept	35.680*** (8.560)	34.489*** (1.266)		127.327*** (11.896)	6.198 (8.470)	36.338*** (8.308)	49.936*** (8.091)	56.263*** (1.410)		47.934*** (10.510)	31.902** (13.609)	49.870*** (8.097)
Village FE	Yes 417	No 417	No 408	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415	Yes 417	No 417	No 408	Yes 417	Yes 416	Yes 415
Observations	417	417	408	417	417	415	417	417	408	417	416	415
R ²	0.288	0.009	-	0.484	0.609	0.319	0.444	0.004	-	0.444	0.541	0.443
Adjusted R ²	0.252	0.006	-	0.458	0.590	0.285	0.416	0.001	-	0.416	0.518	0.415
RMSE	16.371	18.29	-	13.921	12.278	15.847	13.737	17.573	-	13.738	12.482	13.782

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 7. ITT Estimates of Progresá on PRI Vote Share. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on PRI vote share. PRI vote share is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-6) and as a share of total votes cast (Column 7-12). Column 1 reports the original positive effect found in De La O (2013, 2015). However, this estimate is not robust under matching (Column 3), or under the original regression specification but controlling for lag PRI vote share (Column 5). Similarly, we find a null effect of *Progresá* on incumbent support when relying on official PRI vote share as the outcome of interest. This result is robust across all specifications (Columns 7-12).

	PRI (Official Registered Voters)					
	Original Specification	Diff. in Means	Matching	Log Population	Share	Leverage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	0.505 (0.940)	0.742 (1.103)	0.403 (1.127)	0.370 (0.940)	0.121 (0.865)	0.475 (0.948)
Avg. Poverty	1.471 (1.078)			1.510 (1.060)	1.909 (1.164)	1.468 (1.079)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.000 (0.000)				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				-1.557** (0.657)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.023** (0.011)			-0.019* (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.023** (0.011)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.048*** (0.012)			0.047*** (0.012)		0.048*** (0.012)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.048*** (0.017)			-0.047*** (0.017)		-0.047*** (0.018)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.028** (0.012)			-0.028** (0.012)		-0.027** (0.013)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					0.244*** (0.073)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					-0.305*** (0.096)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					-0.242*** (0.067)	
Intercept	35.460*** (5.398)	32.505*** (0.881)		44.041*** (6.762)	24.291*** (9.130)	35.495*** (5.403)
Village FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	417	417	408	417	417	415
R ²	0.379	0.001	-	0.383	0.465	0.377
Adjusted R ²	0.347	-0.001	-	0.352	0.438	0.346
RMSE	8.936	10.841	-	8.907	8.381	8.96

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: **ITT Estimates of *Progresa* on PRI Vote Share (Registered Voters)**. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresa* on PRI vote share. PRI vote share is measured as a share of registered voters. This finding is robust across all regression specifications.

	Turnout (Original)					Official Turnout Among Registered Voters				
	Original Specification (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Original Specification (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	15.630* (8.939)	12.730 (8.526)	6.803 (6.642)	0.819 (4.411)	11.390 (8.441)	-2.013 (2.749)	-2.743 (2.662)	-2.757 (2.672)	-2.372 (2.603)	-2.362 (2.771)
Avg. Poverty	-1.856 (3.240)		0.673 (2.998)	0.300 (2.426)	-1.173 (3.042)	-1.524 (1.096)		-1.335 (1.042)	-0.425 (1.441)	-1.467 (1.091)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.001* (0.001)			0.00003 (0.0002)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.0001* (0.0001)			-0.0001 (0.00004)	-0.0004** (0.0002)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-35.146*** (5.051)					-3.017*** (0.671)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.038 (0.026)		0.058*** (0.022)		-0.032 (0.023)	-0.024** (0.010)		-0.016 (0.010)		-0.024** (0.010)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Original)				0.959*** (0.128)						
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Registered)									0.224* (0.118)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.046 (0.028)		0.033 (0.024)	-0.019*** (0.007)	0.051** (0.026)	0.031*** (0.011)		0.030*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.003)	0.032*** (0.011)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.061 (0.070)		0.073 (0.052)	0.022 (0.018)	0.127* (0.066)	0.041** (0.017)		0.042*** (0.016)	0.016 (0.011)	0.046*** (0.017)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.033 (0.037)		0.030 (0.031)	-0.033*** (0.012)	0.059* (0.035)	0.023* (0.012)		0.023*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.025** (0.012)
Intercept	70.197*** (15.638)	57.112*** (6.068)	260.125*** (24.149)	13.850 (15.579)	69.584*** (14.755)	65.959*** (4.964)	59.504*** (2.046)	82.379*** (6.171)	45.897*** (13.801)	65.909*** (4.936)
Village FE	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415
Observations	417	417	417	417	415	417	417	417	417	415
R ²	0.116	0.004	0.418	0.712	0.197	0.072	0.003	0.104	0.173	0.080
Adjusted R ²	0.071	0.002	0.388	0.697	0.156	0.025	0.0002	0.058	0.131	0.033
RMSE	31.5	31.344	25.194	18.059	29.401	8.685	8.64	8.561	8.433	8.692

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on Turnout.** The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on turnout under an instrumental variable approach. Turnout is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-5) and as a share of registered voters (Column 6-10). Column 1 reports the original positive effect found in De La O (2013, 2015). However, this estimate is not robust when not including pre-treatment covariates in the first and second stage regressions (Column 2), or under the original regression specifications but controlling for log of population (Column 3), lag turnout in ratio (Column 4), or removing the two observations with the largest leverage (Column 5). Similarly, the table reports a null effect when relying on official turnout as the outcome of interest. This result is robust across all specifications (Columns 6-10).

	PRI (Original)					Official PRI Vote Share				
	Original Specification (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Original Specification (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	10.794** (4.698)	10.800** (5.167)	6.644* (3.861)	2.571 (3.370)	9.105** (4.569)	4.370 (4.172)	6.814 (5.296)	4.399 (4.159)	3.129 (3.908)	4.695 (4.243)
Avg. Poverty	0.605 (1.826)		1.739 (1.682)	3.288** (1.527)	0.879 (1.795)	3.925** (1.857)		3.963** (1.825)	4.338** (1.714)	3.848** (1.863)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.001** (0.0003)			-0.00005 (0.0001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)			-0.00003 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-16.655*** (2.174)					0.225 (1.127)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.038** (0.017)		0.008 (0.013)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.019)		-0.023 (0.019)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.019 (0.020)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.065*** (0.020)		0.059*** (0.016)		0.067*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.022)		0.057*** (0.022)		0.053** (0.023)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.032 (0.039)		-0.026 (0.030)		-0.007 (0.038)	-0.114*** (0.030)		-0.115*** (0.030)		-0.122*** (0.031)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.019 (0.020)		-0.020 (0.016)		-0.008 (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.021)		-0.066*** (0.022)		-0.071*** (0.023)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.593*** (0.080)					0.323*** (0.100)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.021 (0.150)					-0.463*** (0.146)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.050 (0.087)					-0.244** (0.106)	
(Share Official)										
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)										
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)										
Intercept	41.393*** (8.118)	28.802*** (3.747)	131.667*** (12.202)	7.715 (8.479)	41.151*** (7.939)	52.249*** (8.167)	52.675*** (4.001)	50.808*** (10.414)	32.729** (13.579)	52.487*** (8.171)
Village FE	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 416	Yes 414
Observations	0.288	0.009	0.484	0.609	0.319	0.444	0.004	0.444	0.541	0.444
R ²	0.252	0.006	0.458	0.590	0.285	0.416	0.001	0.416	0.518	0.415
Adjusted R ²	16.81	18.686	14.141	12.349	16.198	13.876	17.785	13.874	12.583	13.924

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on PRI Vote Share.** The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on incumbent support under an instrumental variable approach. PRI vote share is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-5) and as a share of total vote cast (Column 6-10). Column 1 reports the original positive effect found in De La O (2013, 2015). However, this estimate is not robust under the original regression specifications but controlling for lag PRI vote share (Column 3). Similarly, the table reports a null effect when relying on official PRI vote share as the outcome of interest. This finding is robust across all specifications (Columns 6-10).

	PRI (Official Registered Voters)				
	Original Specification	No Covariates	Log Population	Share	Leverage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	1.484 (2.764)	2.212 (3.288)	1.077 (2.737)	0.389 (2.542)	1.401 (2.794)
Avg. Poverty	1.161 (1.180)		1.293 (1.150)	1.812 (1.246)	1.176 (1.183)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.0001 (0.00005)			-0.0001* (0.00003)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-1.586** (0.658)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.023** (0.011)		-0.019* (0.010)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.024** (0.011)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.048*** (0.012)		0.048*** (0.012)		0.049*** (0.012)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.046** (0.018)		-0.045*** (0.018)		-0.045** (0.018)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.027** (0.013)		-0.027** (0.012)		-0.027** (0.013)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)				0.241*** (0.076)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)				-0.308*** (0.100)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)				-0.246*** (0.070)	
Intercept	36.245*** (5.383)	31.340*** (2.493)	44.744*** (6.729)	24.760*** (9.274)	36.235*** (5.389)
Village FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	417	417	417	416	415
R ²	0.379	0.001	0.383	0.463	0.377
Adjusted R ²	0.347	-0.001	0.352	0.436	0.346
RMSE	8.989	10.913	8.953	8.429	9.012

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* Effect on PRI Vote Share (Registered Voters)**. The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on PRI vote share under an instrumental variable approach. PRI vote share is measured as a share of registered voters. This finding is robust across all regression specifications.




Figure 13: **Intent-to-treat and Instrumental Variable Causal Effects of *Progresa* on Alternative Measure of Turnout.** The left panel reports ITT point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the causal effect of *Progresa* on turnout, measured as total votes cast (valid and invalid) over the number of registered voters, for several different specifications. The right panel reports instrumental variable estimates relying on the same measure of turnout.

	Registration (Females)				Registration (Male)							
	Counts (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Counts (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to	-0.267	4.154*	2.047	-0.342	0.012	-0.335	-0.351	4.418*	2.077	-0.381	-0.034	-0.386
Treat (ITT)	(1.156)	(2.450)	(1.787)	(1.143)	(1.112)	(1.155)	(1.058)	(2.393)	(1.793)	(1.048)	(1.020)	(1.060)
Avg. Poverty	1.665			1.734	2.683**	1.651	0.459			0.503	1.945*	0.463
Population ₁₉₉₄	(1.288)			(1.248)	(1.226)	(1.289)	(1.201)			(1.172)	(1.182)	(1.202)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.000				0.000	0.000	0.000				0.000	0.000
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)	(0.000)				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				(0.000)	(0.000)
				-1.928						-1.969		
				(1.975)						(1.548)		
Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄	1.968***			1.929***	1.799***	1.951***						
Reg. Male ₁₉₉₄	(0.155)			(0.183)	(0.191)	(0.162)						
							2.007***			1.960***	1.806***	1.998***
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.003			0.001		-0.003	(0.131)			(0.146)	(0.164)	(0.145)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	(0.010)			(0.012)		(0.010)	-0.008			-0.003	-0.045	-0.008
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.004			-0.004		-0.003	(0.009)			(0.010)	(0.073)	(0.009)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	(0.010)			(0.011)		(0.010)	0.000			0.000	-0.194	0.000
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.009			-0.008		-0.004	(0.009)			(0.010)	(0.144)	(0.009)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	(0.019)			(0.019)		(0.020)	-0.009			(0.017)	-0.055	-0.007
Turnout ₁₉₉₄	-0.003			-0.003		-0.001	(0.017)			(0.018)	(0.096)	(0.018)
(Eligible)	(0.013)			(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.012)			(0.012)	0.172*	-0.002
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄											(0.103)	
(Share Eligible)											-0.045	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄											(0.073)	
(Share Eligible)											-0.194	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄											(0.144)	
(Share Eligible)											-0.055	
Intercept	13.017*	52.867***		24.287	4.996	13.452*	15.015**	53.079***		26.823**	3.926	15.212**
	(7.585)	(1.671)		(16.360)	(6.624)	(7.678)	(6.733)	(1.574)		(12.553)	(6.620)	(6.887)
Village FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	417	417	408	417	417	415	417	417	408	417	417	415
R ²	0.875	0.005	-	0.876	0.877	0.873	0.882	0.006	-	0.883	0.883	0.879
Adjusted R ²	0.868	0.003	-	0.869	0.870	0.866	0.875	0.004	-	0.876	0.877	0.873
RMSE	10.4	26.967	-	10.382	10.364	10.396	9.968	26.823	-	9.923	10.009	10.004

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: ITT Estimates of *Progres* on Voter Registration Rates. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progres* on voter registration rates. Registration rates are measured with the total number of registered voters as a share of the voting eligible population. Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications (the only exception is the difference-in-means approach) and across both gender groups.

	Registration (Females)					Registration (Male)				
	Counts (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Counts (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	-0.780 (3.372)	12.385* (7.306)	-0.990 (3.312)	0.034 (3.221)	-0.980 (3.376)	-1.030 (3.104)	13.172* (7.135)	-1.109 (3.051)	-0.098 (2.970)	-1.133 (3.110)
Avg. Poverty	1.827 (1.514)		1.934 (1.442)	2.676* (1.514)	1.855 (1.506)	0.674 (1.425)		0.727 (1.368)	1.965 (1.468)	0.700 (1.425)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.0001 (0.0001)			-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.00002 (0.0001)			-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0003)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-1.916 (1.979)					-1.940 (1.553)		
Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄	1.967*** (0.154)		1.928*** (0.183)	1.799*** (0.191)	1.950*** (0.162)					
Reg. Male ₁₉₉₄						2.007*** (0.131)		1.960*** (0.146)	1.806*** (0.164)	1.998*** (0.145)
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.003 (0.010)		0.002 (0.011)		-0.003 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.010)		-0.008 (0.009)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.004 (0.010)		-0.005 (0.011)		-0.004 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)		-0.001 (0.010)		-0.0005 (0.009)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.010 (0.019)		-0.009 (0.019)		-0.005 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.017)		-0.008 (0.017)		-0.008 (0.018)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.003 (0.013)		-0.003 (0.013)		-0.001 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.011)		-0.003 (0.011)		-0.002 (0.011)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Eligible)				0.179* (0.094)					0.173* (0.101)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.090 (0.084)					-0.046 (0.071)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.144 (0.153)					-0.195 (0.142)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.051 (0.096)					-0.055 (0.092)	
Intercept	12.620 (7.713)	46.346*** (5.134)	23.742 (16.482)	5.014 (6.866)	12.961* (7.751)	14.474** (6.836)	46.144*** (4.937)	26.101** (12.650)	3.874 (6.844)	14.623** (6.954)
Village FE	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415
Observations	417	417	417	417	415	417	417	417	417	415
R ²	0.875	0.005	0.876	0.877	0.873	0.882	0.006	0.883	0.883	0.879
Adjusted R ²	0.868	0.003	0.869	0.870	0.866	0.875	0.004	0.876	0.877	0.873
RMSE	10.459	27.35	10.443	10.418	10.457	10.027	27.24	9.983	10.057	10.064

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on Voter Registration Rates.** The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on voter registration rates under an instrumental variable approach. Registration rates are measured with total number of registered voters as a share of the voting eligible population. Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications (the only exception is the specification that fails to control for imbalanced pre-treatment covariates in the first and second stage regressions) and across both gender groups.

	Registration (Females)					Registration (Male)						
	Counts (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Counts (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.011	0.010	0.008	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001
Treat (ITT)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Avg. Poverty	0.015*	0.014	0.015*	0.014	0.017**	0.015*	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.010*	-0.010**	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)		0.037***		0.037***					0.022***			
		(0.009)		(0.009)					(0.006)			
Log(Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄)	0.011	-0.020		-0.020	0.005	0.012						
	(0.015)	(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.015)						
Log(Reg. Male. ₁₉₉₄)						-0.008			-0.027***		-0.006	-0.009
						(0.009)			(0.010)		(0.005)	(0.009)
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄					0.000						0.000	
(Eligible)					(0.001)						(0.000)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄					-0.001						0.000	
(Share Eligible)					(0.001)						(0.000)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄					-0.001						-0.001	
(Share Eligible)					(0.001)						(0.001)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄					0.000						0.000	
(Share Eligible)					(0.001)						(0.000)	
Intercept	0.022	0.105***	0.105***	-0.058	0.063	0.020	0.165***	0.071***	0.071***	0.121***	0.161***	0.168***
	(0.070)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.041)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Village FE	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	417	417	408	417	417	415	417	417	408	417	417	415
R ²	0.087	0.003	-	0.121	0.104	0.084	0.104	0.0004	-	0.109	0.114	0.077
Adjusted R ²	0.038	0.001	-	0.074	0.056	0.035	0.056	-0.002	-	0.061	0.067	0.027
RMSE	0.078	0.077	-	0.076	0.077	0.077	0.051	0.051	-	0.051	0.051	0.051

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: **ITT Estimates of Progresá on the Difference of Log Number of Registered Voters.** The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on the difference of the log of number of registered voters. The difference is computed among voters registered by March 2000 (five months before the presidential election and when voters could no longer register) and the end of June 1998 (three months before households in treatment villages in the *Progresá* evaluation received the conditional cash transfer). Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications and across both gender groups.

	Registration (Females)					Registration (Male)				
	Counts (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Counts (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	0.023 (0.025)	0.027 (0.024)	0.031 (0.023)	0.030 (0.025)	0.024 (0.025)	0.001 (0.016)	0.006 (0.016)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.00002 (0.016)	0.002 (0.016)
Avg. Poverty	0.010 (0.010)		0.008 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.007)		-0.011* (0.007)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.00000 (0.00000)			0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)			0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000* (0.00000)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			0.036*** (0.010)					0.021*** (0.006)		
Log(Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄)	0.012 (0.015)		-0.018 (0.018)	0.004 (0.008)	0.012 (0.015)					
Log(Reg. Male ₁₉₉₄)						-0.008 (0.009)		-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.009)
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)		0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)		-0.00001 (0.0001)		-0.00000 (0.0001)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.00002 (0.0001)		0.00002 (0.0001)		0.00001 (0.0001)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0002 (0.0002)		-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.00003 (0.0001)		0.00002 (0.0001)		0.00002 (0.0001)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Eligible)				-0.00003 (0.001)					-0.0002 (0.0004)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.0004 (0.001)					0.0002 (0.0004)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.001 (0.001)					-0.001 (0.001)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				-0.0001 (0.001)					0.0004 (0.0004)	
Intercept	0.032 (0.069)	0.091*** (0.018)	-0.043 (0.069)	0.079 (0.062)	0.030 (0.069)	0.165*** (0.041)	0.067*** (0.012)	0.125*** (0.044)	0.161*** (0.038)	0.169*** (0.041)
Village FE	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415	Yes 417	No 417	Yes 417	Yes 417	Yes 415
Observations	417	417	417	417	415	417	417	417	417	415
R ²	0.087	0.003	0.121	0.104	0.084	0.104	0.0004	0.109	0.114	0.077
Adjusted R ²	0.038	0.001	0.074	0.056	0.035	0.056	-0.002	0.061	0.067	0.027
RMSE	0.079	0.078	0.077	0.078	0.078	0.051	0.052	0.051	0.051	0.051

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 15: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on the Difference of Log Number of Registered Voters.** The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on the difference of the log of number of registered voters under an instrumental variable approach. The difference is computed among voters registered by March 2000 (five months before the presidential election and when voters could no longer register) and the end of June 1998 (three months before households in treatment villages in the *Progresa* evaluation received the conditional cash transfer). Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications and across both gender groups.




Figure 14: **Heterogeneous Effects of *Progresa* on Turnout by Poverty Index.** The figure shows that *Progresa* did not have heterogeneous effects on turnout. Turnout is measured using the original outcome in De La O (2013, 2015) and official turnout. For each outcome the figure then reports the estimated treatment effect by observed value of poverty from four different regression specifications, where each specification includes interactions between the treatment, poverty, and poverty squared.




Figure 15: **Heterogenous Effects of *Progresa* on PRI Vote Share by Poverty Index.** The figure shows that *Progresa* did not have heterogenous effects on PRI vote share. PRI vote share is measured using the original outcome in De La O (2013, 2015), the official PRI vote share, and PRI votes as a share of registered voters. For each outcome the figure then reports the estimated treatment effect by observed value of poverty from four different regression specifications, where each specification includes interactions between the treatment, poverty, and poverty squared.




Figure 16: **Balance in Lag Outcomes Before and After Matching (GIS Sample)**. The figure shows the presence of significant imbalance in the lag outcomes analyzed in De La O (2013, 2015). In particular, the treatment group has several outliers in lag turnout (as a share of population and registered voters) and PRI vote (as share of population and registered voters), and PAN vote as a share of population. This imbalance disappears after Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) on population and lag outcomes. Original on left; after matching on right of each panel.




Figure 17: **Balance in Pre-Treatment Socio-Economic Covariates Before and After Matching (GIS Sample).** The figure shows the presence of significant imbalance in the pre-treatment covariates in De La O (2013, 2015). In particular, the treatment group reveals the presence of several population outliers. After Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) on population and lag outcomes, without affecting the balance in poverty and number of villages across precincts.

	Turnout (Original)					Official Turnout Among Registered Voters						
	Original Specification (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Original Specification (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	-4.177 (8.188)	-15.178* (8.569)	-4.112* (2.278)	-3.213 (7.816)	0.181 (5.491)	-3.727 (8.254)	-0.485 (0.888)	-0.820 (0.899)	-1.497 (0.960)	-0.491 (0.886)	-0.839 (0.836)	-0.504 (0.892)
Avg. Poverty	24.952* (13.413)			20.641* (11.327)	6.410 (4.512)	26.810* (13.866)	-1.304 (1.006)			-1.421 (1.010)	0.987 (0.965)	-1.252 (1.010)
Population ₁₉₉₅	-0.048*** (0.011)				0.007 (0.008)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.001 (0.001)				0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.001 (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₅)				-79.003*** (18.875)						-2.069*** (0.714)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.030 (0.108)			0.147** (0.066)		-0.114 (0.101)	-0.031** (0.015)			-0.028* (0.015)		-0.038** (0.019)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Original)					1.272*** (0.325)							
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Registered)											0.333*** (0.056)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.199 (0.128)			0.070 (0.076)	-0.030 (0.032)	0.287** (0.129)	0.041** (0.016)			0.038** (0.016)	0.000 (0.003)	0.048** (0.020)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.546** (0.261)			0.228 (0.159)	-0.016 (0.049)	0.709*** (0.297)	0.054*** (0.019)			0.047** (0.019)	0.018** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.023)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.201 (0.129)			0.058 (0.076)	-0.024 (0.037)	0.285*** (0.128)	0.037** (0.017)			0.033** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.044** (0.021)
Villages	-1.040* (0.576)			0.293 (0.516)	-0.055 (0.305)	-1.073* (0.584)	0.023 (0.092)			0.054 (0.092)	0.068 (0.084)	0.022 (0.092)
Intercept	-70.946 (63.755)	54.787*** (7.053)		410.027*** (70.290)	-35.847 (28.075)	-82.199 (66.412)	62.879*** (4.908)	58.254*** (0.722)		75.487*** (6.783)	30.064*** (7.056)	62.620*** (4.952)
Observations	408	408	339	408	408	406	408	408	339	408	408	406
R ²	0.276	0.008	-	0.432	0.830	0.288	0.067	0.002	-	0.073	0.205	0.064
Adjusted R ²	0.262	0.006	-	0.421	0.826	0.274	0.048	-0.0004	-	0.055	0.189	0.045
RMSE	71.671	81.048	-	64.547	40.441	71.268	8.53	8.687	-	8.501	7.888	8.551

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: **ITT Estimates of Progresá on Turnout (GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on turnout when analyzing the sample created by projecting village coordinates onto precincts as described in Section A of the paper. Turnout is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-6) and as a share of registered voters (Column 7-12). The null finding is consistent across most regression specifications.

	PRI (Original)				Official PRI Vote Share							
	Original Specification (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Original Specification (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	-1.437 (3.389)	-6.332* (3.506)	-2.273* (1.354)	-1.037 (3.227)	0.025 (2.521)	-1.272 (3.426)	1.041 (1.422)	1.379 (1.805)	0.100 (2.015)	1.405 (1.436)	0.456 (1.318)	1.020 (1.423)
Avg. Poverty	11.438** (5.576)			9.569** (4.686)	4.625** (2.143)	12.128** (5.773)	2.447 (1.657)			2.587 (1.665)	1.990 (1.525)	2.254 (1.669)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.021*** (0.005)				0.001 (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.003*** (0.001)				0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				-34.219*** (7.648)						1.811 (1.302)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.028 (0.044)			0.048* (0.026)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.060 (0.044)	-0.085*** (0.023)			-0.079*** (0.024)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.072*** (0.026)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.116** (0.052)			0.060* (0.031)		0.149*** (0.055)	0.106*** (0.024)			0.105*** (0.024)		0.093*** (0.028)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.185* (0.105)			0.048 (0.064)		0.246** (0.122)	-0.048 (0.030)			-0.052 (0.032)		-0.069** (0.033)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.073 (0.052)			0.011 (0.030)		0.104* (0.055)	-0.019 (0.024)			-0.021 (0.025)		-0.032 (0.028)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.654*** (0.242)							
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.177 (0.662)							
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Original)					0.282 (0.303)							
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)											0.386*** (0.100)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)											-0.391*** (0.141)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)											-0.229** (0.107)	
Villages	-0.659*** (0.242)			-0.084 (0.213)	-0.237 (0.157)	-0.671*** (0.244)	-0.567*** (0.129)			-0.546*** (0.130)	-0.362*** (0.128)	-0.563*** (0.130)
Intercept	-27.243 (26.611)	27.629*** (2.825)		181.084*** (27.627)	-16.111 (14.033)	-31.417 (27.781)	53.351*** (7.908)	56.345*** (1.382)		42.214*** (11.009)	34.122*** (13.583)	54.476*** (7.965)
Observations	408	408	339	408	408	406	408	408	339	408	408	406
R ²	0.282	0.008	-	0.449	0.764	0.291	0.402	0.001	-	0.392	0.510	0.399
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.006	-	0.438	0.759	0.277	0.390	-0.001	-	0.380	0.500	0.387
RMSE	29.742	33.797	-	26.483	20.501	29.633	14.226	18.099	-	14.352	12.92	14.234

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: **ITT Estimates of *Progresá* on PRI Vote Share (GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on PRI vote share when analyzing the sample generated by projecting village coordinates onto precincts. PRI vote share is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-6) and as a share of total votes cast (Column 7-12). The null finding is consistent across all but one of the regression specifications.

	PRI (Official Registered Voters)					
	Original Specification	Diff. in Means	Matching	Log Population	Share	Leverage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intention to Treat (ITT)	0.172 (0.939)	0.169 (1.115)	-0.859 (1.231)	0.365 (0.942)	-0.488 (0.881)	0.152 (0.942)
Avg. Poverty	0.487 (1.060)			0.504 (1.064)	2.128** (1.077)	0.422 (1.069)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.001* (0.001)				0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				-0.056 (0.806)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.061*** (0.013)			-0.056*** (0.013)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.059*** (0.018)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.079*** (0.014)			0.077*** (0.014)		0.077*** (0.019)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.005 (0.017)			-0.010 (0.018)		-0.010 (0.022)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.004 (0.014)			0.002 (0.014)		0.002 (0.019)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					0.398*** (0.050)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					-0.139 (0.092)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)					-0.101* (0.052)	
Villages	-0.292*** (0.088)			-0.265*** (0.088)	-0.154* (0.085)	-0.290*** (0.088)
Intercept	34.111*** (5.128)	32.679*** (0.875)		34.400*** (7.091)	8.958 (7.084)	34.511*** (5.180)
Observations	408	408	339	408	408	406
R ²	0.319	0.0001	-	0.316	0.439	0.315
Adjusted R ²	0.306	-0.002	-	0.302	0.428	0.301
RMSE	9.194	10.987	-	9.225	8.381	9.217

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: **ITT Estimates of *Progresa* on PRI Vote Share (Registered Voters) in GIS Sample.** The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresa* on PRI vote share when analyzing the sample generated by implementing the approach described in Section A of the paper. PRI vote share is measured as a share of registered voters. This finding is consistent across all regression specifications.

	Turnout (Original)					Official Turnout Among Registered Voters				
	Original Specification (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Original Specification (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	-12.852 (25.190)	-47.802* (26.986)	-10.053 (24.457)	0.561 (17.017)	-11.376 (25.195)	-1.492 (2.731)	-2.584 (2.831)	-1.536 (2.773)	-2.594 (2.583)	-1.537 (2.721)
Avg. Poverty	28.063** (11.907)		23.102** (9.466)	6.267 (6.262)	29.604** (12.250)	-0.943 (1.136)		-1.045 (1.145)	1.643 (1.127)	-0.875 (1.140)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.048*** (0.012)			0.007 (0.008)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.001** (0.001)			0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.001** (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-78.410*** (19.828)					-1.979*** (0.749)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.023 (0.114)		0.150** (0.067)		-0.106 (0.111)	-0.031** (0.015)		-0.027* (0.015)		-0.037* (0.019)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Original)				1.272*** (0.332)					0.335*** (0.057)	
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Registered)								0.037** (0.016)	0.0001 (0.003)	0.047** (0.020)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.192 (0.135)		0.066 (0.081)	-0.030 (0.034)	0.279** (0.139)	0.040** (0.016)		0.046** (0.019)	0.018** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.023)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.535** (0.273)		0.224 (0.165)	-0.016 (0.050)	0.700** (0.308)	0.053*** (0.019)		0.033** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.043** (0.021)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.194 (0.133)		0.054 (0.078)	-0.024 (0.040)	0.278** (0.137)	0.036** (0.017)		0.055 (0.016)	0.074 (0.074)	0.025 (0.025)
Number of Villages	-1.012* (0.568)		0.299 (0.508)	-0.056 (0.282)	-1.049* (0.577)	0.026 (0.092)		0.092 (0.092)	0.084 (0.084)	0.092 (0.092)
Intercept	-79.819 (56.196)	77.409*** (19.003)	399.487*** (86.361)	-35.441 (25.052)	-90.330 (58.447)	61.849*** (4.836)	59.477*** (1.967)	73.877*** (7.098)	28.009*** (7.266)	61.521*** (4.873)
Observations	408	408	408	408	406	408	408	408	408	406
R ²	0.276	0.008	0.432	0.830	0.288	0.067	0.002	0.073	0.205	0.064
Adjusted R ²	0.262	0.006	0.421	0.826	0.274	0.048	-0.0004	0.055	0.189	0.045
RMSE	72.144	82.957	65.042	40.876	71.699	8.588	8.773	8.562	7.979	8.61

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on Turnout (GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on turnout under an instrumental variable approach. Turnout is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-5) and as a share of registered voters (Column 6-10). Across most specifications we find no evidence that the CCT increases turnout. In Column (2) we report a negative and significant effect, but this is the result of the large imbalance across treatment and control precincts.

	PRI (Original)					Official PRI Vote Share				
	Original Specification (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Original Specification (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	-4.420 (10.427)	-19.943* (11.043)	-3.244 (10.097)	0.079 (7.850)	-3.883 (10.456)	3.202 (4.373)	4.343 (5.683)	4.396 (4.495)	1.404 (4.055)	3.114 (4.344)
Avg. Poverty	12.508** (4.876)	10.363*** (3.813)	10.363*** (3.813)	4.604* (2.420)	13.082*** (5.022)	1.672 (1.899)		1.511 (1.915)	1.646 (1.730)	1.489 (1.923)
Population ₁₉₉₄	-0.021*** (0.005)		-34.027*** (8.074)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.003*** (0.001)			0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)								1.552 (1.385)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.026 (0.046)		0.049* (0.026)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.057 (0.048)	-0.087*** (0.023)		-0.081*** (0.024)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.074*** (0.026)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.113** (0.055)		0.059* (0.033)		0.146** (0.060)	0.108*** (0.024)		0.107*** (0.024)		0.095*** (0.028)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.182 (0.111)		0.047 (0.066)		0.243* (0.127)	-0.046 (0.030)		-0.050 (0.032)		-0.066** (0.033)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.071 (0.054)		0.010 (0.031)		0.102* (0.058)	-0.018 (0.024)		-0.019 (0.025)		-0.030 (0.028)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.654*** (0.249)						
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.177 (0.657)						
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.282 (0.301)						
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)									0.388*** (0.100)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)									-0.388*** (0.141)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Official)									-0.227** (0.107)	
Number of Villages	-0.649*** (0.239)		-0.082 (0.210)	-0.237 (0.152)	-0.663*** (0.241)	-0.574*** (0.130)		-0.548*** (0.130)	-0.365*** (0.128)	-0.570*** (0.131)
Intercept	-30.295 (23.326)	37.066*** (7.687)	177.683*** (34.924)	-16.051 (11.671)	-34.192 (24.298)	55.562*** (8.016)	54.289*** (3.852)	46.823*** (12.113)	34.880*** (13.535)	56.701*** (8.123)
Observations	408	408	408	408	406	408	408	408	408	406
R ²	0.282	0.008	0.449	0.764	0.291	0.402	0.001	0.392	0.510	0.399
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.006	0.438	0.759	0.277	0.390	-0.001	0.380	0.500	0.387
RMSE	29.916	34.586	26.669	20.68	29.793	14.331	18.24	14.498	12.989	14.337

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 20: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on PRI Vote Share (GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on incumbent support under an instrumental variable approach when analyzing the sample created by selecting precincts using the geographic coordinates of villages that participated in the *Progresa* evaluation. PRI vote share is measured as in De La O (2013, 2015) (Columns 1-5) and as a share of total vote cast (Column 6-10). Across most specifications we find no evidence that the CCT increases incumbent support. In Column (2) we report a negative and significant effect, but this is the result of the large imbalance across treatment and control precincts.

	PRI (Official Registered Voters)				
	Original Specification	No Covariates	Log Population	Share	Leverage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	0.528 (2.890)	0.533 (3.513)	1.144 (2.949)	-1.502 (2.712)	0.463 (2.875)
Avg. Poverty	0.359 (1.232)		0.224 (1.244)	2.506** (1.228)	0.309 (1.246)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.001 (0.001)			0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			-0.124 (0.859)		
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.061*** (0.013)		-0.056*** (0.013)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.059*** (0.018)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.079*** (0.014)		0.077*** (0.014)		0.077*** (0.019)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.004 (0.017)		-0.010 (0.018)		-0.010 (0.022)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.005 (0.014)		0.003 (0.014)		0.003 (0.019)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)				0.398*** (0.050)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)			-0.139	(0.092)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Registered)				-0.099* (0.052)	
Number of Villages	-0.293*** (0.088)		-0.266*** (0.089)	-0.151* (0.085)	-0.291*** (0.088)
Intercept	34.476*** (5.222)	32.427*** (2.411)	35.599*** (7.806)	7.837 (7.120)	34.841*** (5.295)
Observations	408	408	408	408	406
R ²	0.319	0.0001	0.316	0.439	0.315
Adjusted R ²	0.306	-0.002	0.302	0.428	0.301
RMSE	9.239	11.043	9.278	8.439	9.262

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* Effect on PRI Vote Share (Registered Voters in GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on PRI vote share under an instrumental variable approach when analyzing the spatially-merged sample. PRI vote share is measured as a share of registered voters. This finding is robust across all regression specifications.

	Registration (Females)					Registration (Male)						
	Counts (1)	Diff. in Means (2)	Matching (3)	Log Population (4)	Share (5)	Leverage (6)	Counts (7)	Diff. in Means (8)	Matching (9)	Log Population (10)	Share (11)	Leverage (12)
Intention to	2.996	-12.236	-2.781	3.180	2.578	2.956	2.974	-10.898	-2.628	3.132	2.287	2.945
Treat (ITT)	(5.430)	(7.518)	(2.070)	(5.677)	(4.970)	(5.423)	(5.358)	(6.748)	(1.880)	(5.620)	(4.992)	(5.353)
Avg. Poverty	3.225			3.248	5.749	3.184	1.970			2.025	6.696	1.965
	(3.203)			(3.289)	(8.220)	(3.141)	(2.737)			(2.797)	(9.273)	(2.789)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.003				0.001	0.003	0.002				0.001	0.002
	(0.007)				(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.008)				(0.003)	(0.008)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)				4.781						2.568		
				(9.071)						(11.832)		
Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄	1.440***			1.459***	1.404	1.441***						
	(0.398)			(0.429)	(1.276)	(0.400)						
Reg. Male. ₁₉₉₄							1.385***			1.392***	0.847	1.385***
							(0.461)			(0.511)	(1.454)	(0.464)
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.027			-0.034		-0.031				-0.025		-0.028
	(0.033)			(0.042)		(0.038)				(0.042)		(0.038)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.014			0.018		0.018	0.012			0.014		0.017
	(0.026)			(0.027)		(0.034)	(0.030)			(0.027)		(0.042)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.028			0.037		0.030	0.039			0.043		0.043
	(0.053)			(0.053)		(0.068)	(0.066)			(0.059)		(0.086)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.015			0.020		0.019	0.013			0.015		0.018
	(0.024)			(0.024)		(0.032)	(0.029)			(0.025)		(0.040)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄					-0.964							
(Eligible)					(2.111)							
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄					0.844						0.400	
(Share Eligible)					(1.860)						(1.585)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄					1.617						1.130	
(Share Eligible)					(3.170)						(2.786)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄					0.824						0.433	
(Share Eligible)					(2.138)						(1.916)	
Villages	-0.220			-0.269	-0.293	-0.219	-0.214			-0.233	-0.223	-0.214
	(0.275)			(0.278)	(0.361)	(0.274)	(0.269)			(0.304)	(0.404)	(0.267)
Intercept	-19.665	47.035***		-48.215	-27.496	-19.395	-13.449	45.166***		-28.871	-32.304	-13.380
	(24.532)	(6.087)		(74.168)	(51.371)	(24.101)	(21.677)	(5.356)		(85.145)	(50.208)	(21.359)
Observations	408	408	339	408	408	406	408	408	339	408	408	406
R ²	0.816	0.007	-	0.816	0.820	0.816	0.787	0.006	-	0.787	0.797	0.787
Adjusted R ²	0.812	0.004	-	0.812	0.816	0.812	0.782	0.004	-	0.782	0.792	0.782
RMSE	38.041	72.165	-	38.048	43.648	38.159	38.243	65.862	-	38.389	43.127	38.384

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 22: **ITT Estimates of Progresá on Voter Registration Rates (GIS Sample)**. The table reports a null ITT effect of *Progresá* on voter registration rates. Registration rates are measured with the total number of registered voters as a share of the voting eligible population. Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications and across both gender groups.

	Registration (Females)					Registration (Male)				
	Counts (1)	No Covariates (2)	Log Population (3)	Share (4)	Leverage (5)	Counts (6)	No Covariates (7)	Log Population (8)	Share (9)	Leverage (10)
Early <i>Progresa</i>	9.320 (16.894)	-38.537 (23.676)	10.000 (17.853)	8.226 (15.860)	9.128 (16.743)	9.249 (16.665)	-34.323 (21.251)	9.845 (17.667)	7.269 (15.868)	9.090 (16.522)
Avg. Poverty	0.856 (3.958)		0.752 (4.041)	3.554 (4.529)	0.809 (3.933)	-0.397 (4.045)		-0.439 (4.224)	4.734 (6.752)	-0.418 (4.089)
Population ₁₉₉₄	0.003 (0.007)			0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)			0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.008)
Log(Population ₁₉₉₄)			4.415 (8.661)					2.200 (11.502)		
Reg. Fem. ₁₉₉₄	1.449*** (0.409)		1.464*** (0.435)	1.438 (1.254)	1.450*** (0.412)					
Reg. Male ₁₉₉₄						1.394*** (0.471)		1.397*** (0.517)	0.875 (1.445)	1.395*** (0.475)
Tot. Votes ₁₉₉₄	-0.032 (0.043)		-0.037 (0.048)		-0.037 (0.048)			-0.029 (0.048)		-0.034 (0.048)
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.019 (0.031)		0.023 (0.033)		0.023 (0.040)			0.018 (0.033)		0.022 (0.046)
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.033 (0.059)		0.041 (0.059)		0.033 (0.071)			0.047 (0.065)		0.046 (0.089)
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄	0.019 (0.027)		0.023 (0.027)		0.024 (0.036)			0.019 (0.028)		0.022 (0.043)
Turnout ₁₉₉₄ (Eligible)				-0.987 (2.118)					-0.180 (1.280)	
PRI Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.855 (1.870)					0.409 (1.595)	
PAN Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				1.591 (3.146)					1.116 (2.771)	
PRD Votes ₁₉₉₄ (Share Eligible)				0.818 (2.135)					0.431 (1.914)	
Villages	-0.236 (0.261)		-0.276 (0.274)	-0.310 (0.354)	-0.233 (0.261)	-0.231 (0.256)		-0.240 (0.301)	-0.241 (0.396)	-0.229 (0.255)
Intercept	-12.965 (17.601)	65.272*** (16.523)	-38.956 (63.194)	-21.294 (40.368)	-12.518 (16.809)	-6.741 (14.669)	61.410*** (14.674)	-19.685 (75.831)	-26.748 (39.971)	-6.467 (13.925)
Observations	408	408	408	408	406	408	408	408	408	406
R ²	0.816	0.007	0.816	0.820	0.816	0.787	0.006	0.787	0.797	0.787
Adjusted R ²	0.812	0.004	0.812	0.816	0.812	0.782	0.004	0.782	0.792	0.782
RMSE	38.554	73.619	38.563	43.96	38.665	38.719	67.13	38.851	43.501	38.855

Note:

* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 23: **Instrumental Variable Estimates of *Progresa* on Voter Registration Rates (GIS Sample).** The table reports a null effect of *Progresa* on voter registration rates under an instrumental variable approach. Registration rates are measured with total number of registered voters as a share of the voting eligible population. Columns (1)-(6) and Columns (7)-(12) report estimates for females and males respectively. The estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications and across both gender groups.




Figure 18: **Heterogeneous Effects of Progresa on Turnout by Poverty Index in GIS Sample.** The figure shows that *Progresa* did not have heterogeneous effects on turnout. Turnout is measured using the original outcome in De La O (2013, 2015) and official turnout. For each outcome the figure then reports the estimated treatment effect by the observed value of poverty from four different regression specifications, where each specification includes interactions between the treatment, poverty, and poverty squared.




Figure 19: **Heterogenous Effects of Progresa on PRI Vote Share by Poverty Index in GIS Sample.** The figure shows that *Progresa* did not have heterogeneous effects on PRI vote share. PRI vote share is measured using the original outcome in De La O (2013, 2015), the official PRI vote share, and PRI votes as a share of registered voters. For each outcome the figure then reports the estimated treatment effect by the observed value of poverty from four different regression specifications, where each specification includes interactions between the treatment, poverty, and poverty squared.

Comparison of name-matching sample to GIS sample	Share of Precincts
Population discrepancy in relation to GIS sample	71.30%
Reasons for the discrepancies:	
Does not exclude census villages returned by GIS but includes additional census villages as a result of name-match	11.80%
Excludes at least one census village returned by GIS and includes additional census villages as a result of name-match	32.70%
Excludes at least one census village returned by GIS and does not include additional census villages as a result of name-match	32.4%
Arbitrary choices in name-matching sample	Share of Precincts
At least one electoral village with census village match not in sample	11.40%
At least one electoral village without census village match	26.50%
At least one electoral village matched to multiple census villages	2.20%
Wrong number of electoral villages	5.10%

Table 24: **Characteristics of the De La O (2013, 2015) Name-matching Sample.** The top panel reports the proportion of precincts in the name-matching sample with a population discrepancy from the correct GIS sample, as well as the types of mistakes that led to this problem. The bottom panel reports the proportion of precincts with choices made in generating the name-matching sample that would be inappropriate even if the electoral and census offices had coordinated and names meant the same thing.

3 Additional Theoretical Analysis

In the version of the formal theory proposed in De La O (2015) closest to the contexts in which *Progres*a and SPS were passed and implemented, the incumbent president's party (P) proposes a CCT that is partisan (PCCT, i.e., over which incumbents have discretion) or nonpartisan (NCCT, i.e., a programmatic policy), and the median opposition party legislator (L_O) then decides whether to pass the program. Under the status quo, P receives payoff p^{sq} . Denote the value of clientelism, which is realized only if PCCT is passed, as v_1 for P and v_2 for L_O , where $v_1 > v_2$. Then, if PCCT is passed, the total payoff for P is $p + v_1 - v_2$, where p is the probability P being reelected if NCCT is passed. The payoff for L_O passing PCCT mirrors that of the incumbent: $1 - p - (v_1 - v_2)$. If L_O rejects PCCT, the payoffs for P and L_O are $p^{sq} - e$ and $1 - p^{sq} + e$, respectively, where $e > 0$ "represents the payoff from supporting a nonclientlist poverty relief program, or rejecting a clientelist program, when the other player does not" De La O (*ibid.*, p. 50). The book also assumes $p > p^{sq}$ "because the president can claim credit for the policy innovation." Thus, L_O will only pass PCCT if $1 - p - (v_1 - v_2) > p^{sq} - e$, a condition which never holds.

Alternatively, if P proposes an NCCT, and the opposition passes it, P and L_O obtain payoffs of p and $1 - p$, respectively. If the opposition does not pass the NCCT, the payoffs are $p^{sq} + e$ and $1 - p^{sq} - e$. Thus, De La O (*ibid.*) shows if P proposes an NCCT, the opposition will pass it if the cost of passing the legislation is less than the cost of blocking it or, in other words:

$$p - p^{sq} < e. \quad (1)$$

Then, the incumbent, knowing that the opposition party will never pass a PCCT, is better off with the status quo than PCCT (since $p^{sq} > p^{sq} - e$) and so never proposes a PCCT in the first place. Then, if an NCCT that P proposes doesn't pass, P gets payoff $p^{sq} + e$; if it passes, P gets p . Thus, because P is better off proposing an NCCT, regardless of what L_O does, the equilibrium result is for P to propose and L_O to pass the NCCT.

The result in equation 1 from De La O (*ibid.*) shows that there exist conditions under which the opposition may pass policies that could hurt them. From this result, we now

derive two new implications that may be worthy of further study.

First, we show that the theory is also consistent with the opposite result, that the programmatic incumbent support hypothesis is false. Suppose that incumbents receive little or no benefits from passing an NCCT, i.e., $p \approx p^{sq}$. In this situation, Equation 1 still holds if e is sufficiently large. As such, the theory is consistent with the programmatic incumbent support hypothesis being false and also with it being true; as a result, even if the theory itself is true, it provides no information about the veracity of the programmatic incumbent support hypothesis.

Second, although the theory does not imply the programmatic incumbent support hypothesis, we analyze here whether it is possible to estimate the parameters of the theory (e.g., p , p^{sq} , and e) to test this hypothesis from the experiment, as claimed by De La O (2015). As it turns out, this is not possible. The reason is that estimation would require observing the counterfactual case when an NCCT (or a programmatic policy more generally), was proposed but not passed. However, in the treated and control conditions of both experiments, the policy was proposed and passed for *every* observation, making it impossible to identify most parameters of the theory, including the causal effect of the opposition rejecting vs accepting the proposal, from either the SPS or *Progres*a experiment. Instead, each of the two experiments compares areas where the proposed-and-passed policy was implemented vs not implemented. This is an important quantity, relevant to the programmatic incumbent support hypothesis, but it cannot be used to test the theory in De La O (*ibid.*).

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