Guido Imbens, Donald B Rubin, Gary King, Richard A Berk, Daniel E Ho, Kevin M Quinn, James D Greiner, Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Paul Oyer, and Richard Lempert. 2012. “Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae.” Filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in Abigail Noel Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al.Abstract
In Grutter v. Bollinger,
this Court held that a state has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body for the benefit of all students, and thatthis compelling interest justifies the consideration of race as a factor in university admissions. See 539 U.S. 306, 325, 328 (2003). In this, the latest case to consider the constitutionality of affirmative-action admissions policies, Professor Richard H. Sander, along with lawyer and journalist Stuart S. Taylor, Jr., filed a brief amici curiae arguing that social-8science research has shown affirmative action to be harmful to minority students. See Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Supportof Neither Party (“Sander-Taylor Brief”) 2. According to them, a “growing volume of very careful research, some of it completely unrebutted by dissenting work” has found that affirmative-action practices are not having their intended effect. Id.; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of Petitioner (“Three Commissioners Brief”) 14 (“The Commissioner Amici are aware of no empirical research that challenges [Sander’s] findings.”).
But, as amici will show, the principal research on which Sander and Taylor rely for their conclusion about the negative effects of affirmative action—Sander’s so-called “mismatch” hypothesis2—is far from “unrebutted.” Sander-Taylor Brief 2. Since Sander first published findings in support of a“mismatch” in 2004, that research has been subjected to wide-ranging criticism. Nor is Sander’s research “very careful.” Id. As some of those critiques discussin detail, Sander’s research has major methodologicalflaws—misapplying basic principles of causal inference—that call into doubt his controversial conclusions about affirmative action. The Sander “mismatch” research—and its provocative claim that, on average, minority students admitted through affirmative action would be better off attending less selective colleges and universities—is not good social science.
Sander’s research has “significantly overestimated the costs of affirmative action and failed to demonstrate benefits from ending it.” David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1855, 1857 (2005). That research, which consists of weak empirical contentions that fail to meet the basic tenets of rigorous social-science research, provides no basis for this Court to revisit longstanding precedent supporting the individualized consideration of race in admissions. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“Universities can * * * consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-316 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.,)).In light of the significant methodological flaws on which it rests, Sander’s research does not constitute credible evidence that affirmative action practices are harmful to minorities, let alone that the diversity rationale at the heart of Grutter is at odds with social science.
Does the U.S. Supreme Court curtail rights and liberties when the nation’s security is under threat? In hundreds of articles and books, and with renewed fervor since September 11, 2001, members of the legal community have warred over this question. Yet, not a single large-scale, quantitative study exists on the subject. Using the best data available on the causes and outcomes of every civil rights and liberties case decided by the Supreme Court over the past six decades and employing methods chosen and tuned especially for this problem, our analyses demonstrate that when crises threaten the nation’s security, the justices are substantially more likely to curtail rights and liberties than when peace prevails. Yet paradoxically, and in contradiction to virtually every theory of crisis jurisprudence, war appears to affect only cases that are unrelated to the war. For these cases, the effect of war and other international crises is so substantial, persistent, and consistent that it may surprise even those commentators who long have argued that the Court rallies around the flag in times of crisis. On the other hand, we find no evidence that cases most directly related to the war are affected. We attempt to explain this seemingly paradoxical evidence with one unifying conjecture: Instead of balancing rights and security in high stakes cases directly related to the war, the Justices retreat to ensuring the institutional checks of the democratic branches. Since rights-oriented and process-oriented dimensions seem to operate in different domains and at different times, and often suggest different outcomes, the predictive factors that work for cases unrelated to the war fail for cases related to the war. If this conjecture is correct, federal judges should consider giving less weight to legal principles outside of wartime but established during wartime, and attorneys should see it as their responsibility to distinguish cases along these lines.