A vast literature demonstrates that voters around the world who benefit from their governments' discretionary spending cast more ballots for the incumbent party than those who do not benefit. But contrary to most theories of political accountability, some evidence suggests that voters also reward incumbent parties for implementing "programmatic" spending legislation, over which incumbents have no discretion, and even when passed with support from all major parties. Why voters would attribute responsibility when none exists is unclear, as is why minority party legislators would approve of legislation that will cost them votes. We study the electoral effects of two prominent programmatic policies that fit the ideal type unusually well. For the first, we implement one of the largest randomized social experiments ever, and find that its programmatic policies do not increase voter support for incumbents. For the second, we reanalyze the study cited as claiming the strongest support for the electoral effects of programmatic policies, which is also a very large randomized experiment. We show that its key results vanish after correcting either a simple coding error affecting only two observations or highly unconventional data analysis procedures (or both). Our results may differ from those of prior research because we were able to marshal large scale experiments rather than observational studies or because we analyze relatively pure forms of programmatic policies rather than mixtures of programmatic and clientelistic policies. However, we conjecture that the primary explanation is the differing nature of the politics for which these policies are passed and implemented.
Universities require faculty and students planning research involving human subjects to pass formal certification tests and then submit research plans for prior approval. Those who diligently take the tests may better understand certain important legal requirements but, at the same time, are often misled into thinking they can apply these rules to their own work which, in fact, they are not permitted to do. They will also be missing many other legal requirements not mentioned in their training but which govern their behaviors. Finally, the training leaves them likely to completely misunderstand the essentially political situation they find themselves in. The resulting risks to their universities, collaborators, and careers may be catastrophic, in addition to contributing to the more common ordinary frustrations of researchers with the system. To avoid these problems, faculty and students conducting research about and for the public need to understand that they are public figures, to whom different rules apply, ones that political scientists have long studied. University administrators (and faculty in their part-time roles as administrators) need to reorient their perspectives as well. University research compliance bureaucracies have grown, in well-meaning but sometimes unproductive ways that are not required by federal laws or guidelines. We offer advice to faculty and students for how to deal with the system as it exists now, and suggestions for changes in university research compliance bureaucracies, that should benefit faculty, students, staff, university budgets, and our research subjects.
To prevent gerrymandering, and to impose a specific form of democratic representation, many state constitutions and judicial opinions require US legislative districts to be "compact." Yet, the law offers few precise definitions other than "you know it when you see it," which effectively implies a common understanding of the concept. In contrast, academics have shown that the concept has multiple theoretical dimensions and have generated large numbers of conflicting empirical measures. This has proved extremely challenging for courts tasked with adjudicating compactness. We hypothesize that both are correct --- that compactness is complex and multidimensional, but a common understanding exists across people. We develop a survey design to elicit this understanding, without bias in favor of one's own political views, and with high levels of reliability (in data where the standard paired comparisons approach fails). We then create a statistical model that predicts, with high accuracy and solely from the geometric features of the district, compactness evaluations by 96 judges, justices, and public officials responsible for redistricting (and 102 redistricting consultants, expert witnesses, law professors, law students, graduate students, undergraduates, and Mechanical Turk workers). We also offer data on compactness from our validated measure for 18,215 state legislative and congressional districts, as well as software to compute this measure from any district. We then discuss what may be the wider applicability of our general methodological approach to measuring important concepts that you only know when you see.
Computer scientists and statisticians are often interested in classifying textual documents into chosen categories. Social scientists and others are often less interested in any one document and instead try to estimate the proportion falling in each category. The two existing types of techniques for estimating these category proportions are parametric "classify and count" methods and "direct" nonparametric estimation of category proportions without an individual classification step. Unfortunately, classify and count methods can sometimes be highly model dependent or generate more bias in the proportions as the percent correctly classified increases. Direct estimation avoids these problems, but can suffer when the meaning and usage of language is too similar across categories or too different between training and test sets. We develop an improved direct estimation approach without these problems by introducing continuously valued text features optimized for this problem, along with a form of matching adapted from the causal inference literature. We evaluate our approach in analyses of a diverse collection of 72 data sets, showing that it achieves substantially improved performance compared to existing approaches. As a companion to this paper, we offer easy-to-use software that implements all ideas discussed herein.
We provide an overview of PSI ("a Private data Sharing Interface"), a system we are developing to enable researchers in the social sciences and other fields to share and explore privacy-sensitive datasets with the strong privacy protections of differential privacy.
We show that propensity score matching (PSM), an enormously popular method of preprocessing data for causal inference, often accomplishes the opposite of its intended goal -- increasing imbalance, inefficiency, model dependence, and bias. PSM supposedly makes it easier to find matches by projecting a large number of covariates to a scalar propensity score and applying a single model to produce an unbiased estimate. However, in observational analysis the data generation process is rarely known and so users typically try many models before choosing one to present. The weakness of PSM comes from its attempts to approximate a completely randomized experiment, rather than, as with other matching methods, a more efficient fully blocked randomized experiment. PSM is thus uniquely blind to the often large portion of imbalance that can be eliminated by approximating full blocking with other matching methods. Moreover, in data balanced enough to approximate complete randomization, either to begin with or after pruning some observations, PSM approximates random matching which, we show, increases imbalance even relative to the original data. Although these results suggest that researchers replace PSM with one of the other available methods when performing matching, propensity scores have many other productive uses.